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I. INTRODUCTION 
1. Without question, the international community must give a higher priority to 
providing strong and stable support for international agricultural research aimed at 
increasing food productivity and protecting the environment. At this time, a major 
vehicle for such efforts must be the continuation and strengthening of the international 
agricultural research centers operating under the aegis of the Consultative Group on 
International Agricultural Research (CGIAR). Without stronger support for 
international agricultural research, a growing number of developing countries -- and a 
growing number of poor within those countries -- may face increasingly serious food 
shortages as early as the first decades of the next century, and these problems will 
certainly occur in later decades. If such widespread hunger and damage to the 
environment are to be avoided, farmers of those countries must have access to, among 
other things, a steady stream of effective new technologies so they can raise their 
agricultural productivity and have cost-effective ways to manage their increasingly 
threatened stocks of soil and water. We believe that to meet this need effectively, the 
international centers of the CGIAR must play a major role, and that to do this they must 
receive more financial support than is presently forecast. 
II. THE FOOD SITUATION TODAY 
2. Over the past three decades, rates of increase in food production in developing 
countries as a whole have been satisfactory. Between 1960 and 1990, food production in 
developing countries outpaced population growth. But these overall gains mask five 
important issues: 
a) First, in some regions food production is falling. Between 1960 and 1990, the 
per capita output of food declined in Sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East. Per 
capita output of food fell in 75 of the poorest countries of the world (most of which are 
in Africa, though several are in heavily populated Asia). 
b) Second, as the inevitable companion of poverty, undernutrition persists 
throughout the developing world. Recent FAO-WHO estimates show that around 700 
million people -- nearly one-fifth of the population of developing countries -- are 
undernourished. While the proportion of Asians who are undernourished has decreased, 
the absolute numbers are high and rising: in all, some 500 million people can’t satisfy 
their basic caloric needs. One-third of all Africans -- close to 170 million people -- have 
inadequate diets. 
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c) Third, past rates of increase in food production in the developing countries may 
be slowing down. Per capita output of cereals, the major foodstuff produced in 
developing countries, declined between the mid-1980s and 1993. Annual increases in 
yields of rice and wheat have been slowing down in some of Asia’s most productive areas 
where there has been sustained, intensive production. 
d) Fourth, the natural resource base is steadily deteriorating. Though difficult to 
quantify, sahnization, soil erosion, and the loss of top soil are reducing productive 
capacity in a number of tropical countries and, unless checked, will reduce this capacity 
still further - often irreversibly. 
e) Fifth, the international agricultural research system is eroding. The number of 
international research personnel in the major CGIAR centers - organizations that were 
the foundation of the Green Revolution and that are essential to the further 
technological advances needed to support sustainable food production in the decades 
ahead -- has been reduced by over one-third since 1989 because financial support has 
declined. 
3. Today, achieving and maintaining food security in the developing world is a 
larger and more urgent task, requiring stronger emphasis on agricultural development 
and better management of natural resources. Most of the hungry and malnourished live 
in rural areas and need to produce more food for themselves. In addition, in 
predominantly agrarian societies agricultural development is the principal engine of 
national growth, if agriculture falters in such societies, the entire economy stagnates. 
III. FUTURE FOOD REQUIREMENTS 
4. The volume of food produced must increase enormously to meet demands in 
the next century. According to World Bank projections, the world’s population is 
expected to rise by an average of 90 million people a year up to 2050 (making total 
population 5.5 billion in 1994; 8.5 billion in 2025; and 10 billion by 2050). Of this annual 
9Omillion increase, 86 million a year will be born in developing countries (making total 
population in these nations 4.2 billion in 1994; 7.0 billion in 202.5; and 8.7 billion by 
2050). The largest absolute increases are expected in Asia, where populations are likely 
to grow by nearly 50 million a year to 2025, bringing the region’s population to around 
4.9 billion. The Asian population will then rise by a further 33 million a year to reach 5.7 
billion by 2050. The steepest increases will be in Sub-Saharan Africa, where the region’s 
population is expected to grow by an average of 25 million a year up to 2050 (making 
total population 490 million in 1990; 1.38 billion in 2025; and 2.064 billion in 2050). 
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5. In theory, the aggregate supply of food produced in developing countries is now 
great enough to provide an austere, largely vegetarian diet to satisfy the basic caloric 
requirements of everyone in those countries. But in practice, not all food produced is for 
direct human consumption, and it is not distributed equally among the population at 
large. Even if it were, future food supply would still have to increase at the same rate as 
population growth to meet all people’s basic caloric needs. If current trends in domestic 
production and consumption don’t change, an additional 400 million tons of grain -- a 20- 
percent increase above projected production by 2025 -- will be needed to cover the 
‘hidden hunger” of the poor in the developing countries, according to estimates from the 
International Food Policy Research Institute. Most of the hungry will continue to be in 
South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa. 
6. Realistically, the demand for food will grow as population increases and 
projected rises in per capita incomes spawn new consumption patterns. A steady 
increase is expected in demand for staple foods among the poor in Asia and Africa, 
whose numbers will probably grow from around 700 million today to well over a billion 
by 2025, and whose incomes will remain very modest. Demand for wheat is expected to 
grow more rapidly than for rice as people leave the country for the city and their eating 
habits change. The sharpest increases in demand, however, are expected to be for meat 
and meat-related products as many millions cross income thresholds that enable them to 
afford these foods. Consequently, the derived demand for grains used as animal feed will 
increase substantially as well. 
7. In sum, the demand for food in the developing countries is projected to more 
than double by 2025 and then to rise by at least a further 50 percent by 2050. By 2025, 
the increase in demand for grain in the developing countries is expected to equal more 
than three times the size of the current U.S. harvest. By 2050, the increase in demand is 
expected to equal five times the size of the current harvest in the U.S. (which 
approached 310 million tons in 1990 and accounts for nearly one-fifth of global output). 
The projected increase in demand for rice -- more than 95 percent of which is produced 
and consumed in developing countries, mostly in Asia -- is especially significant. By 2025, 
the annual demand for rice in developing countries (currently 350 million tons) is 
expected to increase to more than 700 million tons (two-and-one-half times the 1990 rice 
production of China, by far the world’s largest producer), and by around five times that 
amount by 2050. Along with projected increases in demand for grains, substantial 
increases are expected in demand for potatoes, cassava, pulses, and other crops that 
account for around 40 percent of total food consumption in developing countries. 
8. This increased demand for food can be met by domestic production, imports 
(including food aid), or both. Food aid (currently around 15 million tons of foodstuffs 
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amntally) is unlikely to augment domestic supplies appreciably except to relieve human 
suffering during emergencies. Imports of food, mostly grains, have risen rapidly over the 
past decade and currently represent around nine percent of total grain consumption in 
developing countries. However, any rapid and continuing increase of food imports would 
divert scarce foreign exchange needed to meet other national priorities. Most developing 
countries will thus have to continue to provide the bulk of their national food supply 
themselves. 
9. Given current trends and the certain need for substantially more food in the 
next century, the recent downward spiral of aid for agricultural development is self- 
defeating, even perilous. In our view, steps must be taken now to begin increasing 
sustainable food *production in developing countries, especially in SubSaharan Africa and 
South Asia. The long lead time between the initiation of research and the application of 
results only compounds this urgency, as does evidence that agricultural growth may be 
less rapid in the future than it has been in the past. 
IV.THERESEARCHNEEDEDTOMEETFUTURE FOOD REQUIREMENTS 
10. Over the past thirty years, “Green Revolution” technology has dramatically 
changed the source of food-production increases in many developing countries. Before 
1960, most increases resulted from expanding acreage under cultivation. Between 1960- 
1990, however, at least SO percent of the IN-percent increase in cereal production came 
from raising yields per acre. These stunning increases in yields were largely the product 
of the development and spread of improved varieties of cereals, a 70-percent expansion 
of irrigation (from 100 to 170 million hectares), and more than tripling chemical fertilizer 
use. 
11. In the years ahead, increasing crop yields will continue to be the key to raising 
agricultural output. The most productive areas are already being farmed, and the scope 
for further expansion of acreage for cultivation is limited, particularly in Asia and the 
Middle East. In addition, increased competition for scarce water and the escalating costs 
of irrigation construction have already slowed the expansion of hrigated agriculture from 
two percent a year in 1960-70 to one percent in 198090, and growth like that of the 
1960s appears highly improbable. (Irrigated lands currently account for 20 percent of all 
arable land, and irrigated agriculture provides about 60 percent of the rice and wheat 
produced in developing countries.) 
12. Even if the area under irrigation increases (albeit slowly), average yields of 
food grains will have to more than double by 2025 if domestic production is to meet most 
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food needs in developing countries. Current technologies, however, may not be able to 
help farmers attain these yields on a sustainable basis; almost certainly, they can’t raise 
the average yields of most grains to the levels needed by 2050. 
13. Raising productivity in the future will require a wide range of policies and 
programs to ensure that millions of farmers -- mostly smallholders -- have the means and 
incentives to adopt improvements. To this end, stable support for effective agricultural 
research is needed. A recent analysis of more than 100 studies of agricultural production 
shows a strong positive correlation among research, technological change at the farm 
level, and agricultural growth in Asian and Latin American countries. Studies undertaken 
by the InterAmerican Development Bank also confirm the substantial contribution that 
well-managed research makes to raising on-farm productivity, as well as the exceptionally 
high economic returns on investments in research -- especially in genetic research, the 
main thrust of the CGIAR centers. Where good leadership, dedicated scientists, good 
science, and adequate resources combine to make research a success, the economic 
returns on investment have been at least 30 percent per annum. 
14. Priority research must from now on focus on increasing yields, bettering farm 
management, and improving natural resource management. The kinds of plant-breeding 
efforts that have already boosted the productivity of many crops deserve special emphasis 
because they can continue to enhance the yield capacity and stabilize production in the 
many environments where food crops are grown. Such research will have to aim at 
increasing yields of both major food crops and the hitherto “under-researched” crops 
(such as cassava and pulses, as well as sorghum and millet, the staple foods in semi-arid 
areas of Asia and Africa) that millions of subsistence farmers grow. 
15. Increasing emphasis on biotechnology research will probably be required to 
sustain the desired growth in yields. Although some genetically altered insect- and 
disease-resistant varieties of food crops may be on the market within a decade, more 
basic research on growth processes and multiple gene manipulation will be required 
before biotechnology can fulfill its promise. Since it may take years for research to yield 
usable results, work on sustainable production of food crops grown in the tropics, 
especially foods grown and consumed by the poor, must begin now. 
16. Research on how to fully exploit the yield potential of improved varieties also 
deserves more attention. Improving the efficiency of farming by better timing farm 
operations, developing more effective crop rotations, intercropping, and optimizing the 
use of fertilizers and pesticides and, where appropriate, irrigation water are all important 
to agricultural success. To be effective, these technical approaches must include a strong 
element of farmer participation. 
ACTION GROUP ON FOOD SECURITY - APRIL 20,1!394 
5 
17. Another need is to increase research on the processes of resource degradation 
and to develop technologies that slow or reverse these processes while improving 
productivity. The goal must be to combine agronomic and ecological principles in an 
analytical framework for improving agricultural efficiency while protecting the natural 
resource base and maintaining biodiversity. 
18. Combined crop-management research and research aimed at improving the 
management of natural resources will help develop techniques for implementing 
environmentally benign food production strategies such as agroforestry, no-till farming, 
water harvesting, and integrated pest management. To buttress this research, further 
work is needed on raising the productivity of irrigation systems by using scarce water 
more efficiently and on integrating crop and livestock production (key to making the best 
use of available resources in many parts of Africa and Asia). 
v. WHO WILL Do THE NEEDED RESEARCH? 
19. In the early 197Os, most agricultural research was conducted in developed 
countries; private-sector research there produced machines, agrochemicals, vaccines, 
implements, and seeds used mostly by commercial farmers. To the extent that resources 
were allocated to crop production in developing countries, the emphasis was on high- 
value crops, usually for export, rather than on basic foodstuffs. Public-sector research in 
developed countries was directed mainly at commercial farmers in the temperate zones, 
whose needs differed greatly from those of small-scale food producers in the arid, semi- 
arid, and humid tropics. Consequently, the vast bulk of research in developed countries 
only tangentially benefitted food producers in developing countries. To a considerable 
degree, this remains true today. 
20. With few exceptions, the national agricultural research systems in ,developing 
countries in the 1970s were weak and in no position to fulfill their mandates. Most 
lacked the political support, the financial means, and the scientific leadership to carry out 
the substantive research needed. 
21. Over the past 20 years, investment in agricultural research on food production 
in developing countries increased, reaching roughly $4.5 billion in the mid-1980s. At the 
same time, seed companies have stepped up their research on such crops as hybrid 
maize. Donor agencies, especially the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID), have funded a number of valuable cooperative programs 
between universities in developed countries and national agricultural research systems in 
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developing countries. * Also, donor-assisted investment in expanding research capacity in 
developing countries has substantially increased. Large numbers of scientists have been 
trained and funds have been made available to build research facilities. Several national 
research systems in the larger developing countries are now well managed and have the 
capacity to undertake excellent research. However, many questions about the most 
effective ways to organize and manage national research systems in many parts of the 
world remain unanswered. 
22. Despite weaknesses in the research systems of many developing countries, a 
complex, mutually supporting network of research institutions has evolved. This network 
includes the CGIAR centers, universities and other advanced research institutions in 
developed and developing countries, national agricultural research systems, and, in some 
instances, seed companies, agriibusinesses, and nongovernmental organizations. Each 
element of this research network plays a vital role. Advanced research centers provide 
basic research on, for instance, biotechnology and plant nutrition. The CGIAR centers 
and organizations such as France’s Center for International Research and Agricultural 
Development (CIRAD), provide scientific leadership, training, and collaborative research 
with national agricultural research systems. 
23. The relationships among these various research groups will continue to evolve, 
especially as some of the national agricultural research centers grow stronger and assume 
new responsibilities (as some are now doing). For the foreseeable future, however, there 
is no substitute for the CGIAR, no other body that can provide the scientific leadership 
(including research coordination), research of international significance, and training 
needed to continue developing the overall international research system, and, ultimately, 
to improve food security in the developing countries. 
VI. THE CGIAR 
24. The CGIAR was established in 1972 under the co-sponsorship of the World 
Bank, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and the Food and 
Agriculture Organization (FAO) to finance and manage a network of International 
Agricultural Research Centers. It started with four centers, expanded to 13 by 1980 and 
to 18 in 1992. (See Table 1.) It now supports 17 centers, each with its own Board of 
’ In addition to continued support for the CGIAR, USAID must continue to support the Collaborative 
Research Support Programs and other agricultural and related research and institution building efforts that 
are important complementary components of an overall strategy to increase food security in developing 
countries. 
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Directors. The original mandate of the CGIAR centers was to undertake research to 
increase food production of a limited number of food crops in the tropics. Subsequently, 
itsmandate was expanded to include research on additional food crops, as well as that on 
forestry and fisheries, strengthening national agricultural research systems in the 
developing countries, and improved management of natural resources. 
25. The CGIAR has many strengths that stem from its international character. 
First, the system provides an apolitical consortium for large and small donors who wish to 
support international agricultural research. Second, the system has been able to recruit 
talented scientists from developed and developing countries, providing them with long- 
term security and the means to do problem-solving research in situ in different 
environments. Through the CGIAR, a critical mass of more than 1,000 senior scientists 
now works exclusively on international-level research to raise food production and to 
improve resource management in developing countries. Third, the CGIAR centers are 
able to develop research strategies that transcend national concerns and boundaries, so 
they are in a position to lead cooperative efforts to implement these strategies. Like no 
other institutions, the CGIAR centers can work closely with advanced research 
institutions in developed countries as well as with thousands of collaborating researchers 
in developing countries to test and evaluate new and improved plants and technologies. 
Thus, in many respects, CGIAR centers provide a bridge not only between “North” and 
“South,” but also between “East” and ‘West,” and they can focus efforts to deal with 
research topics of wide importance to developing countries. 
26. The CGIAR centers have many accomplishments to their credit. These 
include generating a number of improved varieties of the major cereals and working with 
collaborating institutions to adapt these varieties for use in a wide range of environments. 
Overall production increases traceable to the introduction of these varieties are estimated 
to have provided enough food for more than one billion people. At the same time, the 
increased yields have reduced the pressure to expand cultivation into environmentally 
fragile areas. 
27. The CGIAR centers have had success in collaborative breeding programs with 
national research systems on non-cereal crops, including potatoes, cassava and some 
legumes, although these programs have not had the same impact as the work on the 
major cereals. In addition, these centers have contributed importantly to crop- 
management research and have participated in several highly successful transnational 
integrated pest management programs. The CGIAR centers have also provided technical 
assistance that has helped to strengthen many national agricultural research systems. 
They have trained close to 50,000 research workers from all parts of the world, many of 
whom have assumed positions of responsibility in national agricultural research systems. 
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28. While the CGIAR can take credit for many successes, concerns remain. The 
system has expanded incrementally and opportunistically rather than as part of a well 
conceived strategy with a clearly articulated mandate. The highly decentralized 
organization that was appropriate for a $2Omillion program is inadequate for a $250 
million program: more responsive and responsible central management is clearly needed. 
Moreover, the current planning process, based on expectations of donor support that 
often exceed actual funding levels, compounds the instability of the system. (See Table 
24 
29. On the research front, the CGIAR has been criticized for not giving enough 
priority to applications of advances in biotechnology and entomology or to soil science, 
water management, and better management of the natural resources associated with 
agriculture. Also, some centers have not worked closely enough with farmers and local 
groups to ensure that research results are directly relevant and widely available to the 
end-users. 
30. The CGIAR centers have begun to address these concerns and to respond to 
new trends. Although not all have made equal progress, an increasing number have 
begun to: 
a> 
b) 
Cl 
4 
integrate natural resource management into their agricultural 
research agendas; 
employ more social scientists and women to strengthen and 
diversify their staffs; 
conserve genetic diversity by establishing and maintaining 
gene banks and promote it in the breeding of crop varieties, 
thus departing from an early focus on genetic standardization; 
and 
increase their work with farmers. 
More progress is needed. It should be noted, however, that as funding for the 
international centers shrinks, these new approaches are often the first to be cut. 
VII. THE CGIAR’S FUNDING 
31. The CGIAR’s core funding rose from $20 million in 1972 to $229 million in 
1993; in constant 1994 dollars, this represents growth from $79 million in 1972, when 
there were four centers, to $238 million in 1993, when there were 18. The funding level 
is expected to be $215 million in 1994. As Table 3 shows, the funding of the core 
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programs for the system rose rapidly in the early years, then increased at a slower rate, 
with an upward shift in 1992 to fund five additional centers before declining in 1993 and 
1994. In current dollars, funding for the larger system declined by seven percent between 
1992 and 1993, and a further six-percent decline is projected between 1993 and 1994. 
This represents a 21-percent decline in real terms over two years. The impact of the 
cutbacks has been uneven, and the largest burdens have fallen on the centers created 
before 1980; indeed funding for these centers will decline bv 31 percent in real terms 
over five vears. As mentioned above, the problem of decreasing funds is compounded by 
the significant gap between the levels approved for funding and the actual funds made 
available. 
32. The increase in funding between 1972 and 1992 was fuelled by steady growth 
in the number of donors and by increased contributions from some donors. There were 
38 donors in 1993, including 19 bilateral aid agencies from OECD countries, six 
developing country governments, 10 international and regional agencies, and three 
foundations. (See Table 4.) Between 1972 and 1993, 66 percent of all contributions 
came from bilateral aid agencies (principally USAID), while international and regional 
agencies contributed 28 percent (with the largest contribution coming from the World 
Bank); three percent came from foundations. 
33. USAID and the World Bank are the only donors that have established 
quantitative goals for their contributions. USAID originally agreed to provide 25 percent 
of the total funding and the World Bank agreed to contribute first 10 percent, then 15 
percent. While USAID has been the largest single donor (providing $40 to $48 million a 
year from 1982 to 1993), its contribution has declined from a peak of over 25 percent of 
the total core contributions in 1982 to 20 percent in 1988 and 18 percent in 1993, and is 
expected to be as low as 13 percent in 1994. The World Bank’s contribution has risen 
steadily, reaching $37.5 million in 1993 (about 16 percent of core funding) and could total 
$40 million in 1994 (18 percent of core funds). 
34. The actual decline in funding between 1992 and 1993 totalled $18 million. 
The largest drop was the U.S. contriiution (more than $6.5 million). The Canadian, 
Italian, Swedish, and British governments reduced their funding by some $2 million or 
more each, while four other European governments and the European Union chopped 
their contributions by more than $1 million each. The Japanese and Netherlands’ 
contributions increased by more than $5 million and $1 million, respectively. Thus, the 
funding drop in 1993 mainly reflected a fall in the U.S. contribution (which fell yet 
further in 1994) and “wide but shallow” cuts from the OECD bilateral donors. The 
United States is currently considering cutting its funding by a further $10 million in 1995. 
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If this occurs without any offsetting increases from other sources, the system will erode 
seriously. 
35. These current and projected cutbacks make it increasingly important that all 
concerned focus urgently on the long-term outlook for the world food situation and the 
related need not only to support, but also to expand, agricultural research to increase 
food production. 
36. The cutbacks also necessitate an examination of whether additional sources of 
funding and alternative methods of financing the CGIAR centers can be developed to 
insulate the system from cutbacks arising from largely domestic concerns in donor 
countries. Although there have been some efforts to encourage the private sector to 
help fund the CGIAR, and some thought has been given to establishing endowments and 
taking other steps to find funding for essential parts of the system, these efforts have had 
little success and are not likely to resolve the system’s immediate financial problems. In 
sum, overall funding has fallen substantially in real terms at the same time that the 
system expanded by five new centers. As a result, all the centers have been constrained 
and the larger, more established centers have suffered very heavy cutbacks (roughly 33 
percent in real terms). 
37. The CGIAR centers have been allowed to slide into a dangerous and 
untenable situation. There is no visible plan for coping with the expected shortfall in 
funding in 1994, much less with the possibility of longer-term shortfalls. In the interim, 
cutbacks have been managed ad hoc by the individual centers already hard-pressed to 
keep within their current and projected budgets. 
38. The centers have reduced costs by attempting to consolidate and rationalize 
their operations, including cutting staff benefits. In addition, many senior staff posts have 
been left unfilled. Beyond the cuts already made, around 20 percent of the senior posts 
planned for by 1994 will probably be abolished or left vacant under the current budgetary 
proposals. 
39. The centers have also curtailed important research work, as well as outreach 
and training programs. The scope of research has been narrowed, work on such areas as 
germplasm improvement has suffered, and the capacity for technology generation has 
been reduced. 
40. The cutbacks that have taken place and uncertainties about funding have 
already demoralized CGIAR scientists. Key staff are leaving, and attracting the high 
caliber and highly motivated scientists who have long been the backbone of the system is 
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beaming difficult. The uncertainty has also made planning very difficult and 
undermined the serious and sustained research effort that is essential in dealing with 
agricultural problems. 
41. Cutbacks -- both current and projected -- are not the result of a well organized 
and well planned reordering of research priorities. Rather, complacency and inattention 
of the system’s donors and management are to blame. If current funding levels are 
accepted, an accidental, unplanned funding level will become the basis for international 
policy on an important component of food security in developing countries. 
VIII. THEl OUTLOOK FOR THE CGIAR 
42. If funding declines continue, centers will have to be eliminated, programs 
dropped, or both. Whatever path is suggested, already diminished research programs 
would be seriously undermined. Further cuts would fall on innovative research, such as 
that on improving rice-wheat rotations on 12 million hectares in Asia, restoring the 
productivity of intensively cropped rice-producing areas, improving nitrogen efficiency in 
irrigated wheat areas, improving disease resistance (in beans, sorghum, millet, and 
cassava), improving crop management in the semi-arid areas, and developing a vaccine 
for East Coast Fever in cattle. 
43. There is no way of quantifying the cumulative effects on food security of 
reducing the CGIAR centers’ research programs. However, the possible impact can be 
illustrated by considering the effect cuts would have on one promising line of research at 
the International Rice Research Institute, where scientists are working to develop an 
irrigated rice plant that raises yield potential by 50 percent (from 10 to 15 tons per 
hectare) in the tropics. Funding cuts would set back the targets to release this plant type 
to national agricultural research systems before the end of the century. In turn, rice 
production increases of an average of at least one ton per hectare on 80 milhon hectares 
of irrigated land -- an increase large enough to provide the calorie requirements for 400 
million people -- might be delayed. 
45. We believe that the decisive steps discussed in our recommendations below 
must be taken to establish a clear vision of the CGIAR’s future role, as well as a minimal 
scale of activities to be sustained in the future. The keys are shifting away from the 
priorities of earlier years reducing some less essential activities while expanding more 
urgent ones. In all likelihood, funding for the centers in the years ahead would have to 
be larger than in 1993 to allow the system to fulfill its food security and natural resource 
protection mandates. For the years immediately ahead, the world needs a CGIAR 
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system funded at no less than $225 to $250 million in core funding per year in 1994 
dollars; this figure excludes “complementary” funding for special programs. 
46. To stabilize the research program, steps must be taken to develop a more 
robust and predictable method of financing the system. In our view, the World Bank, as 
the senior partner in establishing the CGIAR, must take a strong lead in restructuring 
the system’s activities and in ensuring its financial security in the years ahead. 
IX. RJZCOMMENDA~ONS 
General 
1. We strongly recommend that the international community commit itself to 
sustained support for continuing and strengthening the CGIAR. Stronger backing from 
all the CGIAJX’s financial supporters is needed to assure the system’s integrity. The 
CGIAR centers have made important contributions to food security in developing 
countries, and their future role is every bit as vital. 
2. Since the integrity of the system is now in peril, the first and most urgent short- 
term need is for stability. The present financial instability of the CGIAR is devastating 
to the centers’ research programs, and the need to review both the system’s funding and 
the content of its work is urgent by any reckoning. An internal review is now under way, 
and the results of this review will be discussed by donors at the system-wide mid-term 
meeting in May. We strongly support this effort, and we urge the reviewers to recognize 
that, over time, the CGIAR’s mandate has been broadened from a narrow focus on 
increasing food production to include alleviating poverty, improving the management of 
natural resources, and protecting the environment. We believe that these goals, properly 
focused, should be the overarching priorities of the CGIAR in the next century. While 
this broadened research agenda is necessary, the system should not be pressured, or 
expected, to be something other than a research network. The CGIAR can make an 
enormous contribution to the sustainability of agriculture in developing countries, but 
only if donors resist seeing it as an all-purpose development tool. 
3. If no final decisions are taken at the May meeting, we recommend that: (a) 
interim measures be taken immediately to give the research institutes a firm base of 
financial support for 1994 and 1995 at an annual core funding level of $215 million in 
1994 dollars (see paragraph 4 below); and (b) the internal review process be expanded to 
include a broader range of internationally recognized technical experts from outside the 
system. This work must be done swiftly so the results can be used by the Chairman of 
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the CGIAR to develop a strategy document. This document would be a tool to cultivate 
international consensus among the donors on the long-term scope and financing of the 
CGIAR centers; this in turn should be the basis for final decisions on these issues at the 
CGIAR annual meeting in October 1995. 
Financing the CGIAR System 
4. In the short term, the World Bank, as the senior cosponsor of the CGIAR, 
should take the lead through its President in providing emergency financial support for 
the system. The Bank should assume leadership for rebuilding the system’s financial 
sustainability in the longer run. The system’s financial supporters, especially the United 
States, must cooperate fully in such an effort, in part by finding ways to restore previous 
levels of financial support. With respect to short-term financing, the World Bank should 
work with the leading CGIAR supporters to assure that 1994 and 1995 financing for the 
system at least equals 1993 levels in constant dollars. The World Bank should be 
prepared to make up any shortfall by providing direct support from its earnings. If short- 
term financing cannot be stabilized, steps to reorganize the system, including the 
termination of support for some centers, should be initiated promptly. 
Manapement and Governance of the CGIAR 
5. The CGIAR’s collective leadership should adopt a new management system 
allowing it to make timely adaptive decisions as needs change. To support this process, 
we recommend that: 
The World Bank, as senior co-sponsor of the CGIAR, should 
provide leadership with the full support of its President to 
ensure the effective operation of the system; 
A small but strong Executive Committee, which would include 
experienced persons from developing countries, should be 
established; and 
The Chairman of the CGIAR should continue to devote the 
time necessary to provide active, system-wide leadership for 
all elements of the system in this crucial period. 
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THE CGIAR SYSTEM 
Date of Core budget 
foundation 
CCIYW (and joining) 
Hp;th-S (USS millions. 
1993) Main areas of focus 
Original members of rheqstem, jotaIded before the CGIAR: 
IRRI (international Rice Research 1960 Los Barios. Philippines 
institute) (1971) 
25.8 
24.1 
21.9 
Rice @o&l); rice-based ecosystems &a) 
CI.MMYT (Centro lnternacional 
de Mejoramiento de Maiz y Trigo) 
IITA (International Institute 
of Tropical Agriculture) 
1966 Mexico City, Mexico 
(1971) 
1967 hadan. Nigeria 
(1971) 
CUT (Centro lntemacional 196j Cali. Colombia 
de Agricuitura Tropical) (1971) 
Founded or adoprcd 6y the CGIAR. to bruaden the system, after 1971: 
ICRISAT (International Crops 
Research institute for the 
Semi-Arid Tropics) 
1972 
(1972) 
CIP’ (Centro lnternacional 1970 
de la Papa) wm 
IUUD~ (International Laboratory 1973 
for Research on Animal Diseases) (1973) 
ILCA* (International Livestock 1974 
Center for Africa) (1974) 
IBPGR’ (International Board 1974 
for Plant Genetic Resources) (1974) 
WARDA’ (West Africa Rice 
Development Association) 
[CARDA (International Center 
for Agricultural Research in the Dry 
ArC3S) 
ISNAR (International Service 
for National Agricultural Research) 
IFPRI’ (international Food Policy 
Research Institute) 
1970 
(1975) 
1975 
(1975) 
1980 The Hague, 
(19~1 Netherlands 
1978 Washington. DC, 
/I9801 United States of 
Hyderabad. India 
LimzPCN 
Nairobi, Kenya 
AddisAbaba. Ethiopia 
Rome, Italy 
Bouakt, C6te dlvoire 
Aleppo. Syria 
Fouuded oradoptedby the CCUR tostmngthen iu mission, after 1990: 
ICRAF’ (International Centre 1977 Nairobi, Kenya 
for Research in Agroforestry) (1991) 
II&II1 (International Irrigation 1984 cohbo, sti knh 
Management Institute) (1W 
ICLARMI (International Center for 1977 Manila. Philippines 
living Aquatic Research (1994 
Management) 
ZNlBAPlJ (International Network 1984 Montpellier. France 
for the Improvement of Banana and 09921 
Plantain) 
ClFOR (Center for International 1993 Bogor. Indonesia 
Forestry Research) (1993) 
25.5 
26.9 
15.1 
10.9 
13.5 
9.0 
5.2 
16.2 
6.6 
8.3 
11.9 
6.8 
4.2 
2.1 &tain and banana (global) 
3.4 Sustainable forestry management (global) 
Wheat. maize. triticale (global) 
Sustainable production systems for the humid 
lowland tropics: soybean, maize, cassava. 
cowpea, plantain. yams, sweet potato (sub- 
Saharan Africa) 
Sustainable land use in tropical America; beans. 
cassava. foragesand pastures (global). rice (ktin 
America and the Gribbean) 
Sustainable production systems for the 
semi-aridtropics: sorghum, pearl millet. 
finger millet. chickpea, pigeonpea. and 
groundnut, (Asia, sub&hat-an Africa) 
Potato (gbhd), swe& potato (ktm America. 
Asia). 
Livestock disease (global), tickborne dieseases. 
trypanosomiasis (sub-Saharan Africa) 
Animal feed and production systems: cattle. 
sheep. goats (sub-Saharan Africa) 
Plant genetic resources of current and potenrjal 
crops and forages. collection and gene pool 
cons&ation (global) 
Rice (West Africa) 
Wheat, barley. chickpea, lentil, pasture and 
kz$ zu;” small ruminants (West Asia- 
Strengthening national agricultural research 
system (global) 
Food policy, socioeconomic research related to 
agricultural development (global) 
Agmforestry; multi-purpose trees (global) 
Irrigation management (global) 
Sustainable aquatic mowce management (Asia) 
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ii::, 
119.8 
130.9 
143.8 
164.7 
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i68.6 
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224.5 
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21 220.7 
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Nominal Annual fpl 
Annual lMlfl!lOll AnhUd 
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1% 
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237.3 
286.8 
252.0 
251.9 
234.2 
256.5 
262.7 
267.8 
274.7 
275.1 
Ef 
235.6 
2I5.0 
S.918 
3.800 
3.528 
3.114 
2.800 
2.583 
2.579 
2.217 
2.030 
1.813 
1.348 
I.530 
1.454 
1.389 
I.334 
1.303 
1.265 
1.224 
1.171 
1.117 
1.081 
I a30 
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CGIAR Core funding, 1972- 1094 
(1094 $ million) 
““V 
280 - 
260 - 
240 - 
220 - 
200 - 
180- 
iso- 
140- 
120- 
loo- 
80- 
60 I I I I I I I I I I I I 
72 74 76 78 80 82 64 56 66 90 92 94 
73 75 77 79 81 83 85 87 89 91 93 
- (war) 
TABLE 4 
CGIAR Donor Rankinp of Core Grants. 1988 - 1993 
(USS millions) 
08-Mar-94 
#1 
World Bank 
Donor 
Japan 
Canada 
U.K. 
U.S. 
Germany 
IDB 
Switzerland 
EEC 
30.00 
1988 
World Bank 
20.21 
Donor 
Japan 
42.22 
13.76 Canada 
U.S. 
11.51 EEC 
10.81 Germany 
10.55 IDB 
9.59 U.K. 
9.19 Switzerland 
33.34 
1989 I 
World Bank 
19.87 
Donor 
Japan 
14.37 EEC 
11.84 
44.141 
Canada 
11.18 
U.S. 
U.K. 
11.13 Germany 
10.87 IDB 
9.53 Switzerland 
34.33 World Bank 
23.19 
1990 
Japan 
15.41 
1 
Canada 
Donor 
15.35 EEC 
11.57 
45.09 
U.K. 
11.20 
1 
Germany 
U.S. 
10.50 Switzerland 
9.38 UNDP 
1991 Donor 
45.63 U.S. 
35.11 World Bank 
23.70 Japan 
15.73 Canada 
13.45 Germany 
11.57 EEC 
11.04 U.K. 
10.16 Switzerland 
6.64 Sweden 
1992 1 Donor 1993 esl 
48.12 1 U.S. 41.57 
37.62 World Bank 37.81 
26.89 Japan 32.12 
17.55 Canada 14.73 
13.71 Germany 12.67 
13.33 EEC 12.18 
11.10 Switzerland 9.25 
10.60 U.K. 9.04 
8.62 Netherlands 8.61 
#lO UNDP 8.99 Italy 9.49 Netherlands 6.89 Ncthcrlanda 6.45 Netherlands 7.64 UNDP 6.66 
Italy 8.09 UNDP 7.52 UNDP 6.33 IDB 6.31 UNDP $87 Sweden 6.35 
#20 
Netherlands 
Sweden 
Norway 
France 
Australia 
Finland 
Belgium 
Dtnmark 
Austria 
Rockefeller 
Ford Fdn 
AFDB 
IDRC 
Spain 
India 
Arab Fund 
China 
OPEC Fund 
6.26 Sweden 
5.41 Netherlands 
3.85 Finland 
3.30 Norway 
3.13 Australia 
2.74 France 
2.53 Denmark 
2.53 Belgium 
1.00 Rockefeller 
0.93 AFDB 
0.79 Austria 
0.72 Ford Fdn 
0.63 IDRC 
0.50 IFAD 
0.49 Arab Fund 
0.35 India 
0.30 Spain 
0.28 China 
5.47 
1.89 Rockefeller 
1.141 AFDB 
Swcdco 
0.98 Austria 
0.79 
5.43 
Ford Fdn 
Italy 
0.63 IDRC 
0.52 
5.16 Finland 
ADB 
0.51 Spain 
0.50 
4.09 Norway 
IFAD 
0.50 India 
0.30 
3.70 France 
Ireland 
3.60 Australia 
2.64 Denmark 
2.50 Belgium 
1.741 AFDB 
1.23 1 Ford Fdn 
6.20 
1.00 Austria 
Italy 
0.94 Rockefeller 
0.78 
6.10 
Arab Fund 
Sweden 
0.63 IDRC 
0.50 
5.31 Finland 
India 
0.50 Korea 
0.50 
4.70 
Spain 
Norway 
0.31 IFAD 
4.10 France 
3.81 Denmark 
3.57 Belgium 
3.16 Australia 
6.07 Norway 
6.07 Italy 
5.91 IDB 
4.68 France 
4.10 Denmark 
3.39 Australia 
3.31 Belgium 
3.17 Ford Fdn 
1.55 Rockefeller 
1.18 Austria 
1.00 Finland 
0.90 IDRC 
0.64 ADB 
0.54 Arab Fund 
0.50 Spain 
0.50 Korea 
0.50 China 
0.36 India 
5.83 Denmark 
5.80 Norway 
5.11 Australia 
4.91 IDB 
4.86 France 
4.38 Ford Fdn 
3.30 Italy 
1.75 Belgium 
1.47 Austria 
1.05 Arab Fund 
1.01 IDRC 
0.89 Rockefeller 
0.79 AfDB 
0.62 Ireland 
0.62 Spain 
0.50 China 
0.50 India 
0.50 Indonesia 
4.85 
4.65 
4.24 
4.17 
3.22 
2.44 
2.40 
2.35 
1.50 
0.89 
0.87 
0.85 
0.73 
0.66 
0.62 
0.50 
a.50 
0.50 
#30 IFAD 0.28 OPEC Fund 0.30 China 0.30 Ireland 0.34 IFAD 0.41 Korea 0.50 
Philippines 0.25 Ireland 0.28 Philippines 0.20 ADB 0.31 Ireland 0.34 IFAD 0.42 
Ireland 0.16 Philippines 0.18 Nigeria 0.09 China 0.30 AFDB 0.23 UNEP 0.36 
Nigeria 0.12 Brazil 0.05 Brazil 0.01 Luxembourg 0.25 Philippines 0.22 OPEC Fund 0.29 
UNEP 0.05 ADD 0.03 Arab Fund 0.00 Philippines 0.20 OPEC Fund 0.11 Finland 0.24 
B&i1 0.02 UNEP 0.03 UNEP 0.00 Nigeria 0.12 Mexico 0.04 Philippincx 0.20 
ADB 0.00 Nigeria 0.02 Mexico 0.00 OPEC Fund 0.12 Nigeria 0.03 ADD 0.20 
M&co 0.00 Mexico 0.00 OPEC Fund 0.00 Mexico 0.10 Brazil 0.00 Lucmbourg 0.13 
Kellogg 0.00 Kellogg 0.00 Kellog 0.00 Brazil 0.09 Kellog 0.00 Nigeria 0.02 
Leverhulme 0.00 Leverhulme 0.00 Leverhulme 0.00 UNEP 0.03 Luxembourg 0.00 Brazil 0.00 
#40 Saudi Arabia 0.00 Saudi Arabia 0.00 Saudi Arabia 0.00 Kellog 0.00 Saudi Arabia 0.00 Kcllog 0.00 
Saudi Arabia 0.00 UNEP 0.00 M&co 0.00 
211.54 224.52 234.91 232.02 247.29 229.33 
